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PRIVATIZATION IN VIETNAM: THE NEXT
STEP IN VIETNAM'S ECONOMIC
TRANSITION FROM A NONMARKET
TO A MARKET ECONOMY
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent breakdown of the political and economic sys-
tems of nonmarket economy nations (NMEs) has led many of
these nations to institute market economies.1 For the NME,
this transition involves eliminating government ownership and
control over the nation's means of production and transferring
it to private parties.2 Significantly, this transition requires the
government from which economic power is taken to draft laws
making this possible.3 As one treatise points out, market econ-
omies are not wholly exempt from governmental regulation,
but are subject to "taxes, banking rules, minimum wage laws,
product safety standards, review for national security reasons"
and so on.4 The market, however, not the government, still
largely determines what to produce, how much to produce and
how much to charge.5 When the government prohibits market
influences through mechanisms like price controls, state-run
industries and collectivized agriculture, the nation is a NME.6
This Note examines Vietnam's transition from a N ME to
a market-oriented system, with emphasis on its laws pertain-
ing to privatization. Part II of this Note discusses privatization
in transitional economies generally by considering two privat-
ization models: the "big bang" approach followed by Eastern
1. For a general background addressing the changing economies in Eastern
Europe, the former Soviet Republics and China, see CHANGING POLITICAL ECONO-
MIES: PRIVATIZATION IN POST-COMMUNIST AND REFORMING COMMUNIST STATE (Vidat
Milor ed., 1994) [hereinafter CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMIES].
2. See Andrei A. Baev, Is There a Niche for the State in Corporate Gover-
nance? Securitization of State Owned Enterprises and New Forms of State Owner-
ship, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 47 (1995) (arguing that privatization is a process of
"cutting back the range of government[all supervision over private affairs" that
does not necessarily go as far as the "abolition of this supervision.").
3. See id. at 3.
4. RALPH H. FOLSOM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS 796-97 (1995).
5. See id. at 797.
6. See id.
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Europe and the gradual approach used by the People's Repub-
lic of China (PRC or China).' Examining the approaches taken
in these nations reveals the significance of the economic and
political context within which each nation instituted privatiza-
tion.' Further, the consequences of each approach serve as
guides for Vietnam's economic transition. Part III examines
the political and economic context within which Vietnam began
to reformulate its economic strategy and the objectives behind
this reformulation. Particular attention will be given to the
importance of the reorganization of Vietnam's Communist
Party (VCP) and the passage of the Law on Foreign Invest-
ment (FIL)9 as the starting points for reform. Part III consid-
ers the tension between reformers who want to maintain eco-
nomic change at its current pace and conservatives who want
to forestall reform.1" Of concern is whether Vietnam's efforts
to transform its economy are realistic given the political dichot-
omy within the VCP.
7. See Lan Cao, The Cat That Catches Mice: China's Challenge to the Domi-
nant Privatization Model, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L. L. 97, 100 (1995); see also CHANG-
ING POLITCAL ECONOMIES, supra note 1 (presenting articles which challenge the
traditional approach to privatization).
8. See Cao, supra note 7, at 107-08. Cao points to the ideological and to the
economic considerations that "underlie the decision to adopt one model over the
other." Id. at 108. She further notes:
A political motive was fundamental to the decision by Eastern European
countries to pursue a model founded on speedy and mass privatization of
state owned enterprises. In a similar vein, an equally fundamental polit-
ical impulse caused China to adopt a model that insulates the state
sector from change and preserves, to the extent practical, vestiges of
social ownership.
Id.; see also Robert Seidman, et al., Big Bangs and Decision-Making: What Went
Wrong?, 13 B.U. INT'L. L.J. 435, 436 (1995) (arguing that "[uuless specifically
responsive to the imperatives of their particular circumstances, laws and regula-
tions remain all growl and no bite. Context is all.").
9. Law on Foreign Investment, Dec. 29, 1987 (amended 1990 and 1992),
translated in 1 STATE COMMITTEE FOR CO-OPERATION & INVESTMENT & PHILLIPS
Fox, FOREIGN INVESTmENT LAWS OF VIETNAM, at 1-1 (1994) [hereinafter SCCI &
Fox].
10. See Economic Reforms Threatened, BUS. VIETNAM, Aug. 1996, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Busvie File. "A bitter power struggle between conservatives
and reformers over the past year in VN has seen the country's decade-old reform
process almost grind to a halt." Id. A similar conflict exists in the People's Repub-
lic of China (PRC or China) between the government's desires to obtain "private
capital and improve enterprise performance' and "the basic principle of Marxism
that the 'ownership of the means of production' must remain in the hands of the
state as surrogate for all the people." See Matthew D. Bersani, Privatization and
the Creation of Stock Companies in China, 1993 COLUaM. BUS. L. REV. 301, 305.
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Part IV discusses and evaluates three laws that promote
privatization in Vietnam: the Law on Companies (LC)," the
Law on Private Enterprises (LPE)2 and the Temporary Regu-
lation on the Issuance of Bonds and Stocks of State Owned
Enterprises (TRIBSSOE).3
Part V evaluates Vietnam's success at instituting market
reform and encouraging the development of a private sector.
Part V concludes that Vietnam's political and economic posi-
tion provides the prerequisites for successful transformation
and privatization using the gradual approach. Part V also em-
phasizes that Vietnam's economic reform is still considerably
dependent on investments, resources and loans from interna-
tional institutions and other countries that favor speedy eco-
nomic reform. As such, Vietnam's gradual reform needs to
proceed steadily. In conclusion, this Note proposes specific
steps the VCP should undertake in order to proceed with its
transition to a market economy.
II. PRIVATIZATION IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES
Broadly defined, privatization is the introduction of a pri-
vate enterprise into the economy.'4 A law allowing a florist to
become self-employed by opening his own shop illustrates this
type of privatization. 5 The more common, narrow definition
of privatization is the transfer of state owned enterprises to
private ownership. 6 Legislation permitting the sale of state
11. Law on Companies, Dec. 21, 1990 (amended July 1, 1994), translated in 3
SCCI & FOX, supra note 9, at XIV-13.
12. Law on Private Enterprises, Dec. 21, 1990 (amended July 1, 1994), trans-
lated in 3 SCCI & FOX, supra note 9, at X1V-1.
13. Temporary Regulation on the Issuance of Bonds and Stocks of the State
Owned Enterprises, Sept. 17, 1994 [hereinafter TRIBSSOE]; TRIBSSOE was issued
in connection with Decree No. 120/CP, Sept. 17, 1994 [hereinafter TRIBSSOE
Decree]. Both TRIBSSOE and the TRIBSSOE Decree were available on the
internet at <http'//homevnd.netenglish/legal-docs/doc042.html> as of January 22,
1998.
14. See Richard M. Phillips & Marian G. Dent, Privatizing Eastern Europe: A
Challenge for the Nineties, 575 PRAc. L. INST. COMM. L. PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 445 (1991).
15. See id.
16. See id. (stating this is the definition used today in the context of Eastern
Europe). Cf Cao, supra note 7, at 144-51 (exploring reformation of China's exist-
ing state sector). Cao observes that China's economic transition began with re-
forms that improved public sector efficiency and productivity. These reforms have
"had a percolating effect on the behavior and performance of the state sector." Id.
BROOK. J. INT'L L. [Vol. XXIII:3
owned firms to private entities through direct sale,17 a public
offering or private sale of shares", or voucher distribution 9
exemplifies this more familiar model of privatization." Na-
tions determine their approaches to privatization by the goals
they intend to achieve and the political and economic contexts
within which they institute reform."
The past few decades provide several examples of NMEs
changing their economies to private-oriented systems.2 An
examination of the countries in Eastern Europe and the PRC
provides a foundation for an effective analysis of the privatiza-
tion process in Vietnam. The nations in Eastern Europe and
the PRC embarked on their transitions with different goals
and within distinct political and economic contexts.' The
overthrow of Communism in Eastern Europe motivated Soviet-
bloc nations to initiate rapid privatization schemes, the object
of which was aimed to completely transfer property rights from
public to private ownership.24 In contrast, the transformation
of Soviet Communism in the PRC motivated that nation to
begin a gradual process of privatization, whereby private sector
development was encouraged while maintaining the state sec-
at 146. Only then did China begin to gradually allow private ownership of state
enterprises. See id. at 104.
17. See Baev, supra note 2, at 8.
18. See id. at 10.
19. See id. at 10-11. "Voucher privatization" involves distributing privatization
vouchers to every citizen in the country to "be used to acquire shares in the state
enterprises without any additional compensation." Id. This method of privatization
was popular in Eastern Europe where many individuals did not have the money
to purchase shares in state-owned firms. See id. However, as Professor Baev
points out, under the conditions of a nonmarket economy, with an absence of li-
quidity and a lack of effective legal rules and institutions to protect public inves-
tors, voucher privatization might not be as efficient as it tends to be in developed
industrial countries. See id. at 11.
20. See generally Richard C. Schneider, Jr., Privatization in One Country: For.
eign Investment and the Russian Privatization Dynamic, 17 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 697, 709-12 (1994) (discussing the Western economic doctors' pre-
scription for the ailing Soviet economy).
21. See Cao, supra note 7, at 108-11. China is an example of a nation that
has privatized gradually, see id. at 100, while the countries in Eastern Europe
exemplify an immediate approach to the privatization of state enterprises. See id.
at 106, 107.
22. See CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMIES, supra note 1.
23. See Cao, supra note 7, at 108-30.
24. See Bersani, supra note 10, at 303. This is the traditional method of re-
form. See Cao, supra note 7, at 99. It involves fast-paced change coupled with the
complete transfer of state ownership to private hands. See id.
890
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tor." The approach and speed by which these nations privat-
ized their economies varied depending upon different political
and economic reasons for instituting change.
A. Goals of Privatization
The most common goal of privatization is the complete
transfer of property rights from public to private ownership.26
There are many reasons that a NME decides to redistribute
these rights. State ownership of commercial enterprises often
becomes unsuccessful, plagued by inefficiency and the produc-
tion of poor quality goods." State owned enterprises prefer to
over-employ and remain unproductive rather than see unem-
ployment rise and unproductive industries shut down. As such,
the cost of maintaining state enterprises tends to become a
tremendous burden on the state's economy.2 8
Political changes in a NME nation are another common
reason for privatization. 29 Economic reform may be part of a
shift in the nation's political ideology, as in the Eastern Euro-
pean nations. Further, a desire for foreign investment may
cause a NME to privatize."0 Market-oriented institutions are
25. See Bersani, supra note 10, at 303. This is the non-traditional approach to
privatization. See Cao, supra note 7, at 107. It employs a gradual program of
establishing market oriented processes into the economy prior to any transfer of
property rights from public to private hands. See id. The non-traditional approach
may not even involve any transfer of property rights. See generally Baev, supra
note 2, at 48 (arguing that privatization for some socialist countries means liberal-
ization and deregulation and not simply property redistribution).
26. See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 8, at 437-38 (discussing Poland's "jump" to
a market economy); see also Baev, supra note 2, at 8-9. Among the most common
types of privatization are: sale of enterprise assets, reorganization of large state
enterprises into separate entities, private investment in state enterprises, decrease
of government's equity position, acquisition by the workers of controlling interests
in state enterprises and public offerings or private sales of shares. See id.
27. See Paul B. Stephan III, Toward a Positive Theory of Privatiza-
tion-Lessons from Soviet-Type Economies, 16 INVL. REV. L. & ECON. 173, 174
(1996) (observing that, according to 1990 estimates, the Soviet Union achieved
significantly lower levels of consumption per capita and labor productivity than the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries, with the differ-
ence growing over time).
28. See id. (observing that central planning could not seem to "provide the
general population with the benefits that a command system was expected to
provide.").
29. See Cao, supra note 7, at 97-98; see also discussion infra Part II.B.1.
30. See F. Gale Connor, Vietnam: Trading with the Enemy or Investing in the
Future?, 25 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 481, 482 (1994) (observing that the "new
BROOK. J. INTL L.
more attractive to investors than are centrally-planned enter-
prises. Investors who want to compete in free markets without
overly intrusive governments may refuse to invest in NME
nations. In addition, not surprisingly, investors will be reluc-
tant to invest in nations where their assets could end up being
appropriated.
The goal of privatization is not always the complete trans-
fer of property rights from public to private ownership. As an
alternative, some nations institute private sector development
while maintaining the state sector rather than effect an abso-
lute transfer of property rights.3 Under this scenario, a na-
tion may, as the PRC did, strive to achieve greater efficiency in
state owned firms, rather than pursuing a complete transfer to
private ownership.32 In addition, when changes in public own-
ership occur, they may take the form of the acquisition of
shares in limited amounts rather than complete relinquish-
ment to private hands.33
1. "Big Bang" Privatization
A nation striving to completely transfer public property
rights to private ownership follows the traditional approach to
privatization, referred to as the "big bang." The "big bang" is a
rapid departure from government control of the economy and
the immediate institution of private ownership.34 "Big bang"
privatization involves: introducing free prices, opening econo-
mies to international trade and investment, removing state
policy toward investments" reflected in the Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam
"virtually invited foreign businesses to return to Vietnam."). Similarly, as economic
reform in China has gone forward, the PRC has concentrated on encouraging for-
eign investment in reformed state-owned enterprises. See Preston M. Torbert, Chi-
na's Evolving Company Legislation: A Status Report, 14 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS.
1, 2 (1993).
31. See Cao, supra note 7, at 100 (discussing privatization in China).
32. See Torbert, supra note 30, at 2-3.
33. See id. at 3 (noting that the PRC has "allowed, on an experimental basis,
changes in ownership to include the acquisition of shares in state owned enterpris-
es by employees and, in some cases, by third parties.").
34. See Cao, supra note 7, at 99; Seidman, supra note 8, at 436. Big Bang
privatization has been referred to as "transition in a single gulp." Id. This method
of privatization "involves an open sale of assets in which particular state organs
that have indisputable right to convey assets transfer an unambiguous bundle of
ownership rights in those assets to persons in the private sector." Stephan, supra
note 27, at 184. Change under this approach is commonly referred to as "shock
therapy." Cao, supra note 7, at 98.
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subsidies, making currencies freely convertible, tightening
fiscal and monetary policies, selling off state owned enterpris-
es, closing inefficient factories and laying off unnecessary
workers.35
"Big bang" privatization is the dominant approach to mar-
ket reform. A nation that is anxious to have an economy based
on private property rights often thinks that the immediate
transfer of state assets to private ownership is the best means
to implement a market economy. 6 Privatization is considered
the key to economic reform. The proponents of "big bang" pri-
vatization include many developed countries as well as inter-
national organizations like the International Monetary Fund,
the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD).3" These countries and organi-
zations often make privatization and the establishment of free
markets a requirement before investing or providing financial
assistance to a NME nation."8 Therefore, it can be inferred
that a nation in need of foreign investment and financial assis-
tance will be reluctant to diverge from "big bang" measures.
The immediate results of "big bang" privatization are very
often higher prices, unemployment, lost income and greater
foreign debt.3" Proponents argue that these are short-term
effects that lead to long-term benefits.4 ° The problem with
this argument is that the dramatic transfer in property rights
does not necessarily result in higher efficiency in the use of
productive assets.4 The "big bang" approach does not address
the problems that lead to inefficiency, poor management and
low production.42 Nations following the "big bang" method
tend to focus almost exclusively on privatization-as if it were
a magic solution-and tend to overlook the unintended conse-
35. See CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMIES, supra note 1, at 1; Seidman, supra
note 8, at 437-38.
36. See Cao, supra note 7, at 115. Among the countries in Eastern Europe,
"most embraced the privatization of state enterprises as the linchpin of market
reform." Id.
37. See id. at 116; Private Sector Role Defined, BUS. VIETNAM, July 1996,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Busvie File.
38. See Cao, supra note 7, at 116.
39. See CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMIES, supra note 1, at 1.
40. See id. at 1-2.
41. See id. at 2.
42. See Seidman, supra note 8, at 444-45.
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quences of privatization.13 Consequently, management by pri-
vate owners may disappointingly be as unprofitable and ineffi-
cient as it was by the state.
2. Gradual Privatization
There is debate as to the effectiveness and necessity of the
"big bang" approach for all NMEs in transition. As a result, a
non-traditional approach has emerged, referred to as "gradual-
ism." The gradual model involves establishing a private sector
in which companies can freely operate before transferring state
owned enterprises into private hands." In addition, gradual
privatization involves improving state firms, rather than mere-
ly transferring ownership.45 A gradual system allows partial
public ownership of state enterprises through the sale of
shares or bonds rather than complete relinquishment to the
private sector.4" Proponents of gradualism argue that fo-
cusing on improving state firms prior to transfer, rather than
merely selling them as is, permits firms to address the reasons
for inefficiency, low production and the lack of profitability. In
contrast, "big bang" proponents assume private ownership is
the solution to these deficiencies. Therefore, by establishing a
private sector prior to state sector privatization, gradualism
often avoids the problematic results of "big bang" privatiza-
tion.47
43. See id. at 445.
44. See Cao, supra note 7, at 107. The Chinese model favors retention of state
enterprises and encouragement for the creation of new enterprises in a separate
private sector. See id.
45. See Torbert, supra note 30, at 2-3.
46. See Baev, supra note 2, at 12. "Mixed state-public property enterprises are
a worldwide phenomenon of our day." Id. In 1991, the French government permit-
ted the partial privatization of certain state-owned enterprises through the sale of
minority interests of shares, investment certificates, equity loans and various other
financial instruments to the public. See id.; see also Anthony E. Boardman &
Aiden R. Vining, The Behavior of Mixed Enterprises, 14 RES. L. & ECON. 223, 223
(1991) (describing "[m]ixed enterprises (MEs)" as "corporations where some per-
centage of the shares are held by private shareholders and some percentage by
national or sub-national governments.").
47. See infra Part II.C.
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B. Political and Economic Factors Determining Processes of
Privatization
Certain circumstances determine whether a nation follows
the "big bang" model or the gradual approach to privatization.
Nations that are experiencing political and economic turmoil
are less inclined to privatize gradually than nations that are
privatizing under conditions of greater stability.48 The tran-
sitions undergone in Eastern Europe provide examples of na-
tions that embarked on the process of privatization amidst
turmoil and instability.49 In contrast, the transition under-
gone in the PRC was conducted in a more stable political and
economic environment." By examining how these nations de-
fined their privatization approaches and reviewing the results,
insights for developing an effective plan for privatization in
Vietnam are revealed.
1. Nations in Eastern Europe
The fall of Communism in Eastern Europe from 1989-91
motivated the nations in that region to establish free-market
economies.51 Reformers attempted to privatize as quickly as
possible for several reasons: the economies were failing,5 2
state-run enterprises were inefficient and unprofitable53 and
there were political voids that required immediate action.54 In
addition, there was a political motive for fast reform.55 Politi-
48. See Cao, supra note 7, at 113. The countries of Eastern Europe aimed to
abandon their Communist past as quickly as possible by transforming their cen-
trally-planned economies to free-market systems. See id. Conversely, China had no
such objective. See id. China's foundation for economic transformation involved
maintaining stability while instituting change. See id.
49. See id. at 97.
50. See id. at 113.
51. See generally id. at 97 (attributing the collapse of the Berlin Wall to the
introduction of market-oriented economic reform in Eastern Europe).
52. See Phillips & Dent, supra note 14; Stephan, supra note 27, at 174. Phil-
lips & Dent argue that overthrowing the communists in Eastern Europe was the
easy part. See Phillips & Dent, supra note 14. The huge challenge faced by the
governments of Eastern Europe was rapidly privatizing their economies in order to
raise capital, eliminate the burden on state budgets and develop ways to encour-
age long term economic growth. See id.
53. See Phillips & Dent, supra note 14. Years of management under state-
control resulted in inefficiency. See id.; Cao, supra note 7, at 114.
54. See Cao, supra note 7, at 114 (describing Eastern Europe's "sense of politi-
cal urgency.").
55. See Vidat Milor, Introduction to CHANGING POLITICAL ECONOMIES, supra
1998] 895
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cal parties and lobbying groups barely existed in Eastern Eu-
rope when post-Communist governments took office."6 This
provided an opportunity to make radical changes guided by
practical concerns rather than partisan pressures. 7 Thus, to
avoid the risk that political opponents would try to block eco-
nomic reform, privatization had to be implemented quickly. 8
Immediate privatization had tremendous appeal since
there was no time to experiment with other methods. At a time
when there was a political vacuum and the economy was in
shambles, remedying state enterprises was less appealing than
transferring them to private hands. Since free markets worked
well and central planning did not, changing immediately from
state to private ownership was considered the best and most
expedient, path to profitable market economies."9
2. The People's Republic of China
On the other side of the world, the PRC began transform-
ing its economy under different circumstances and for different
reasons. There was no political mandate requiring the PRC to
drastically change its entire economy. In fact, the central tenet
of economic reform in the PRC was to maintain central plan-
ning and gradually introduce market-oriented enterprises into
a separate new private sector.6 ° From an economic standpoint,
the primary purpose of privatization in the PRC was to mobi-
lize the vast resources the nation had accumulated."' Citizens
had collectively become rich, harboring huge amounts of moneyin personal savings. Private control over such massive re-
sources created a potential political threat to the govern-
note 1, at 1, 2.
56. See id.
57. See id.; see also Cao, supra note 7, at 114. "The process of privatization
entails enormous risk, and there [was] a real possibility that the process [w]ould
still become paralyzed." Id. at 114 (quoting Jeffrey Sachs, Accelerating Privatiza-
tion in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, in 1991 PROCEEDINGS OF THE WORLD
BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIES). Political opposition in Eastern
Europe could have come from adversely affected groups such as labor unions, old
Party members and former owners wanting to reclaim their property. See Cao,
supra note 7, at 114.
58. See Milor, supra note 55, at 2.
59. See Cao, supra note 7, at 107.
60. See id. at 107.
61. See Bersani, supra note 10, at 303.
62. See id. at 304.
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ment." The PRC's solution to this problem was to permit
these financial resources to be invested in state enterprises."
Reformers in the PRC adopted a gradual approach to pri-
vatization. This involved the creation of a private sector prior
to limited privatization of the state sector.65 Gradual privat-
ization provided several economic and social benefits which
serve as guides for Vietnam. First, it is arguably more benefi-
cial to commit economic resources to creating new, privately-
owned firms rather than investing in the transfer of state
firms to private ownership or the complete destruction of state
firms. 6 In addition, it is advantageous to establish a nonstate
sector strong enough to absorb some of the disruption that
occurs with state sector privatization.6 7 With a market frame-
work in place, the government is better suited to promote eco-
nomic reform while maintaining stability in the nation."
C. The Results of Privatization and Insights for Vietnam
The results of the privatization programs adopted in East-
ern Europe and the PRC provide important insights for Viet-
nam. "Big bang" transitions throughout Eastern Europe creat-
ed recessions, unemployment, sinking levels of industrial pro-
duction and inflation.69 Economists have predicted that these
economies will not reach pre-transition production levels for at
least ten years.70 Not surprisingly, political instability ensued
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See Cao, supra note 7, at 99-100.
66. See id. at 121
67. See infra Part 1.C.
68. See Cao, supra note 7, at 110. "A basic premise underlying the Chinese
model is that the fundamentals of a market-oriented economy must be established
before state sector privatization can be successfully pursued, if pursued at all." Id.
at 107.
69. See Seidman, supra note 8, at 438. As Seidman points out, in Czechoslo-
vakia and Poland, industrial production in 1993 fell to about 65% of the last pre-
transition year. In East Germany, it fell from an index of 190 in 1990, to an
index of 70 in the last quarter of 1991. Inflation grew to serious levels every-
where. In Poland, for example, it persisted at 35% per year. Unemployment, which
was formerly close to 0% by official estimates, shot up. In Poland, it rose to
11.4%. See id. Real wages fell and, quite importantly, the countries attracted little
foreign investment. See id. at 439. Economic inequity increased, social supports
disappeared without adequate substitutes and social evils like prostitution flour-
ished with the freedom from any central constraint. See id. at 440.
70. See id. at 438.
1998] 897
BROOK. J. INT"L L.
under such -dire economic circumstances. Throughout Eastern
Europe, the people voted to replace reformers with former
Communists."
The PRC's gradual privatization avoided many of the ad-
verse results of the "big bang" approach. Over a period from
roughly 1985 to 1995, the PRC underwent remarkable growth
in its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that averaged approxi-
mately 10% per year." In addition, the PRC saw rises in both
average and median standards of living."3 The PRC, however,
experienced its own problems. Inflation was difficult to man-
age, domestic and foreign debt increased, substantial income
and wealth disparities emerged and, in many economically
advanced areas, sweatshops and child labor appeared. 4 The
PRC's one-party political system did not allow the people to
vote out the reformers as in Eastern Europe."5 As a result,
since the late 1980s, the Chinese have expressed their dissatis-
faction in messages to the government through strikes and
other labor actions, as well as through peasant unrest."6
As Vietnam formulates its privatization program, it should
gain insights from the experiences of the nations of Eastern
Europe and the PRC. The dramatic changes that took place in
Eastern Europe created economic and political unrest. Since
Vietnam does not need to evade its political past as the nations
of Eastern Europe did, it is unnecessary for Vietnam to pursue
such drastic reform. Vietnam's political and economic condi-
tions allow for gradual implementation of its economic goals,
similar to the PRC's experience. Gradual privatization has the
potential to increase Vietnam's GDP and its standard of living.
However, the PRC had problems with controlling inflation,
monitoring debt and overseeing labor conditions. In light of
this, even with gradual privatization, Vietnam would need to
institute effective monetary policies, contain national and for-
eign debt and provide for fair employment conditions.
The insights Vietnam derives from the experiences of other
NMEs do not nullify Vietnam's own obstacles. Within the VCP,
71. See id. at 440.
72. See id. at 440-41.
73. See id. at 441.
74. See id.




there is ongoing debate between conservatives who want to
forestall economic reform and reformers who want to maintain
the pace or speed it up.7" In addition, Vietnam needs a consid-
erable amount of economic assistance from international orga-
nizations and other nations who generally favor market econo-
mies." Although Vietnam should privatize gradually to avoid
the negative consequences of dramatic reform, it cannot afford
to proceed too slowly. The result of too much hesitation toward
privatization could be decreased foreign investment and eco-
nomic assistance, which would seriously threaten Vietnam's
economic resurgence and entrance into the world economy."9
III. FOUNDATIONS OF VIETNAM'S ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION
The current state of Vietnam's economy is a result of its
political and economic history. With a population of over 76
million people, Vietnam represents one of the larger markets
in Asia."0 Furthermore, the people are a comparatively well-
educated,"' productive workforce"2 and the country is abun-
dant in raw materials." However, Vietnam's political history
and governmental structure historically kept the nation eco-
nomically isolated and under-developed. Since the early 1990s,
however, the nation embarked on a path of economic transfor-
mation in order to better utilize its abundant resources, devel-
op its economy and, ultimately, establish a market-driven
economic system.
77. See Economic Reforms Threatened, supra note 10; Vietnam: Review 1997,
ASIA & PACIFIC REV. WORLD INFO., May 1997, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
78. See discussion infra Part III.B.
79. See Vietnam, IBC INTL COUNTRY RISK GUIDE, June 1997, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Busanl File.
80. See id. This number represents the July 1996 estimate.
81. As of 1989, the percentage of the population, age 15 and over, who could
read and write broke down as follows, (1) total population: 88%; (2) male: 93%;
and (3) female: 83%. See Vietnam, in CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD
FACTBOOK 1995, at 453 (1995).
82. See generally id. (recording a 1990 estimate of the size of the labor force
as 32.7 million and breaking this figure down by agriculture (65% of the labor
force) and industrial and service (35% of the labor force)).
83. See generally id. at 454 (reporting that crude oil and rice comprise Viet-
nam's most abundant natural resources and observing that Vietnam is the third
largest exporter of rice in the World, behind the U.S. and Thailand). Nearly 75%
of Vietnam's export earnings are generated by crude oil and rice. See id. Addition-
al export products are agricultural products, marine products and coffee. See id.
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A. Historical Background
Vietnam was ruled by China from the second century B.C.
to the tenth century A.D.' In the late 1850s, the French
gained control and ruled until May 7, 1954.86 As a result of
foreign rule, the Vietnamese were limited in their ability to
own land,87 to improve technology and to industrialize. 8 On
May 7, 1954, the French were forced to surrender and Vietnam
gained its independence.89 Vietnam was partitioned into two
sections: the communist-oriented Democratic Republic of North
Vietnam and the western-oriented Republic of South Viet-
nam.9" The division was supposed to be temporary, providing
for country elections and unification within two years.9 This
did not happen. Tensions developed between the North and
South.2 The North waged guerrilla warfare against the
South, elections to unite Vietnam were never held and Viet-
nam remained at war until 1975."3
While Vietnam was at war, the North received economic
and military aid from the Soviet Union and China and the
South received military aid from the United States. 4 On
April 30, 1975, South Vietnam fell95 and the United States
included it in the trade embargo that had already been im-
84. GEORGE L. HARRIS ET AL., DEP'T OF THE ARMY, U.S. ARMY AREA HAND-
BOOK FOR VMNAM 7, 7 (reprint 1964) (1962).
85. See id. at 16-17 (discussing French conquests of South Vietnam from 1858-
1867 and North Vietnam from 1867-1883).
86. See id. at 1, 8, 28.
87. See id. at 1. Most Vietnamese were rice farmers. See id. The French gov-
ernment confiscated land belonging to former Vietnamese officials who had fled or
resisted them and transferred it to French or Vietnamese collaborators. See id.
Many Vietnamese were left to work for large landowners, paying to use the land
and forced to provide a share of the crops they harvested as rent. See id. at 2.
88. See Robert L. Wunker, The Laws of Vietnam Affecting Foreign Investment,
28 INTL LAW. 363, 364 (1994). The lack of technological improvements drained
Vietnam's natural resources, ultimately resulting in its poor economic standing. See
id.
89. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 84, at 8.
90. See id. at vii; Barbara G. James, Vietnamese Law in English: A Selected
Annotated Bibliography, 84 L. LiBR. J. 461, 463-64 (1992); Thomas R. Stauch,
Comment, The United States and Vietnam: Overcoming the Past and Investing in
the Future, 28 INTL LAW. 995, 999 (1994).
91. See HARRIS ET AL., supra note 84, at vii; James, supra note 90, at 463.
92. See Stauch, supra note 90, at 999.
93. See id. at 1000; James, supra note 90, at 463.
94. See Stauch, supra note 90, at 1000.
95. See id. at 1004.
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posed on North Vietnam.96 The following year, Vietnam was
unified as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) 7
Upon the unification of Communist Vietnam, the VCP
instituted a centrally-planned, socialist economy. The 1992
Constitution describes the 1976 unification. "On 2nd July 1976,
the National Assembly of unified Vietnam decided to rename
the country the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the entire
country embarked on a transition to socialism, trying to build
the country and defend with perseverance the fatherland while
performing its international obligations.""8 The Constitution
established socialist production relations with a highly central-
ized managerial mechanism. 9 The state controlled the econ-
omy and all means of production.'
With its tumultuous history, Vietnam's past is important
to understanding the issues it faces as it attempts to shift its
non-market economy to a market-oriented system. Years of
foreign rule, from the second century B.C. until 1954, resulted
in the development of a socialist government in Vietnam dedi-
cated to maintaining political and economic control. According-
ly, as the country embarks on its economic transition, there is
a divide within-the government between proponents and oppo-
nents of economic reform. 101
96. See id. The regulations that were part of the U.S. trade embargo included
31 C.F.R. § 500.204 (1996) (banning purchases, transport, imports and transactions
with respect to merchandise originating in Vietnam) and 31 C.F.R. § 505.10 (1996)
(banning transactions involving the shipment of certain merchandise from any
foreign country to Vietnam). These regulations continued until President Clinton
lifted the trade embargo on February 3, 1994. See 31 C.F.R § 500.578 (1996) (au-
thorizing new transactions involving property in which Vietnam or its nationals
have an interest).
97. See CONST. OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM preamble, para. 4
(1992), reprinted in CONSTrrUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, at 3 (Albert
P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1992) [hereafter CONSTITUTIONS].
98. Id.
99. Id. art 15, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 97, at 6. See generally,
Hoang The Lien, On the Economic Provisions in the 1992 Constitution of Vietnam,
VIETNAM L. & LEGAL FORUM, Apr. 1995, at 29 (comparing the provisions on the
economic system in the 1946, 1959 and 1980 Constitutions).
100. VIETNAM CONST. art. 15, reprinted in CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 97, at 6.
101. See Vietnam: Review 1997, supra note 77.
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B. Vietnam's Economy Since the War
The adoption of communism in Vietnam was accompanied
by isolation from the U.S. economy'0 2 and from the economies
of other industrialized nations that avoided dealing with Viet-
nam in order to preserve their own economic relations with the
United States.' Vietnamese trade was thus conducted al-
most exclusively with the Soviet Union and the communist
nations of Eastern Europe.'O As a result, much of Vietnam's
investment and commercial legislation concentrated on encour-
aging foreign investment from these nations. 5
Vietnam experienced economic difficulties with central
planning."' Previously profitable industries stagnated 7
and the Vietnam average per capita income fell to under
US$200 per year.' Not surprisingly, Vietnam became one of
the world's poorest countries. 9 A devastating harvest in
1982 forced the VCP to acknowledge that its socialist economy
102. See Foreign Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. § 500.201 (1996) (pro-
hibiting all individuals subject to United States jurisdiction from engaging in virtu-
ally any transaction with Vietnam); see also Connor, supra note 30, at 485;
Stauch, supra note 90, at 1008-09; Paul B. Walsh, Comment, Vietnam's Labor
Law: Can Labor Peacefully Coexist with Foreign Investment, Economic Development,
and Structural Reform?, 8 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 125, 125 (1995).
103. See Stauch, supra note 90, at 1008-09; Walsh, supra note 102, at 125.
104. See Stauch, supra note 90, at 1009; Walsh, supra note 102, at 126.
105. On November 3, 1978, the Government of the U.S.S.R and the Socialist
Republic of Vietnam signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. The provisions
of the agreement stress the need to advance the economies of both countries. See
Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation, Nov. 3, 1978, U.S.S.R.-Vietnam, 17 I.L.M.
1485. Based on the principles set out in this treaty, in 1983, the countries signed
the Agreement on Long-Term Program for the Development of Economic, Scientific
and Technical Cooperation, Oct. 31, 1983, U.S.S.R.-Vietnam, 23 I.L.M. 659.
106. See Stauch, supra note 90, at 1009. Central planning included "the forced
collectivization of agriculture and the rapid centralization of all industry and com-
merce in the south." Connor, supra note 30, at 482.
107. See Stauch, supra note 90, at 1009.
108. See id.
109. See id.; Connor, supra note 30, at 482 (describing the results of economic
socialization as "an economic disaster."). One author has observed:
Dr. Nguyen Xuan Oanh, a former prime minister of South Vietnam de-
scribed the Communist transformation as follows: "In 1976, one year after
the liberation-actually, they called it liberation but we don't call it
that at all, we call it defeat-they joined the countries into one system,
one made up of Maoism and Stalinism. Step by step, the country ground
to a halt."
Stauch, supra note 90, at 1009.
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was failing."' In addition, the Soviet Union's economic prob-
lems led that nation to decrease trade with, and economic aid
to, Vietnam."' As a result of its worsening economic situa-
tion, the VCP realized the need for reform.'
C. The Beginning of Economic Reform in Vietnam
Vietnam's economic reform has occurred in phases. As one
author observes, "the Vietnam Government hesitantly intro-
duced economic reforms as early as 1979, but those reforms
were not implemented until the VCP's Congresses of 1986 and
1991.""' The devastating 1982 harvest prompted the VCP to
take decided steps."" The Soviet Union's economic problems
were yet another stimulus for reform." 5 Finally, upon the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, the VCP reformulated its eco-
nomic strategy.16 The two starting points for Vietnam's eco-
nomic reform were the reorganization of the VCP and the pas-
sage of the FIL.
1. The Influence of Political and Economic
Conditions on Reform
Vietnam was virtually bankrupt, economically isolated and
politically ostracized when economic reform began. Neverthe-
less, the VCP was reluctant to give up control of the political
and economic life in the nation."7 The VCP took hasty mea-
sures that resulted in further economic problems; the plan
resembled those instituted in Eastern Europe. As one authori-
ty observed:
110. See Stauch, supra note 90, at 1010.
111. See id. at 1010; Premier Presents Government Work Report, BBC SUInMARY
OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Apr. 10, 1997, available in LEXIS, World Library, Curnws
File.
112. See Stauch, supra note 90, at 1009-10. The government's reluctance to
change is attributable to several factors: (1) the long struggle for independence, (2)
years of isolation from non-Communist nations, (3) a lack of willingness to give up
control and (4) fear of the capitalist excesses invading the nation.
113. See id. at 1009-10.
114. See id. at 1010.
115. See id.; Walsh, supra note 102, at 126.
116. See Stauch, supra note 90, at 1010.
117. See Mark Sidel, Law Reform in Vietnam: The Complex Transition from
Socialism and Soviet Models in Legal Scholarship and Training, 11 UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 221, 221-22 (1994);. Stauch, supra note 90, at 1010-11.
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In derogation of the traditional Stalinist approach, the 1985
reform plan had included replacing heavy industry with light
industry and agriculture, decentralizing control, emphasizing
free market forces, eliminating state worker subsidies and
devaluing currency. The results of these reforms included an
increase in prices, currency speculation, lower production and
shortages.
1 8
Similar to the fast-paced transitions in Eastern Europe, an
explosive, dramatic approach to change in Vietnam failed."'
In 1986, a reorganization of the VCP leadership began
with many members replaced by economic reformers. 2 ° In
1987, still more members were replaced and forced retirement
was imposed upon approximately 60% of the delegates to the
National Assembly.'2 ' The next election, in 1987, for the first
time allowed candidate nominations at public meetings instead
of by party appointment.' 2" This election resulted in the polit-
ical demise of the party's conservative stranglehold. It is sig-
nificant that these political changes occurred through elections
rather than party appointment. This placed the new VCP in a
favorable position to pursue economic reform with public sup-
port.'
Although the changes in VCP membership were extensive,
they were less chaotic than similar changes in other commu-
nist nations. For example, in the former Soviet Union, explo-
118. W. Gary Vause, Doing Business With Vietnam-Prospects and Concerns for
the 1990s, 4 FLA. J. INT'L L. 231, 240-41 (1989).
119. See id. at 240.
120. See id. As described by one author.
Eight cabinet members responsible for economic management were
replaced at a Central Committee meeting which ended June 6,
1986 ....
An election at Sixth Communist Party Congress, held December
15-18, 1986, produced new leaders in the most drastic political change
the party had experienced in its fifty-six years of existence ....
Id. at 241. These men had been "associated .. . with Ho Chi Minh." Id.
121. See id. at 242 (noting that "Ithe new leadership clearly was moving to
eliminate the deadwood in the National Assembly before the [next] Assembly elec-
tion.").
122. See id. at 243 (observing that there were "more candidates on the ballot
than in previous elections. Eight hundred twenty-nine candidates campaigned for
496 seats in 1987, compared to only 600 candidates in 1981 who competed for the
same number of seats.").
123. See id. at 244. This public support for reform contrasts sharply with the
context of reform in Eastern Europe. See supra Part II.B.1.
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sive political uprisings preceded economic reform, resulting in
economic disaster." Additionally, in Eastern Europe, the na-
tions attempted to abandon communism as quickly as possible
and the result was hasty reform with problematic results."
In Vietnam, communism remained and the changes in VCP
membership occurred within the Communist regime. The
changes in VCP membership were enough to launch economic
reform. Similarly to the PRC, economic reform in Vietnam
began within the Communist political system.'26 Accordingly,
the PRC's gradual approach to instituting a market economy is
instructive for the VCP as it decides how economic reform will
proceed.
2. "Doi Moi" and the Law on Foreign Investment
In 1986, the VCP held its Sixth Communist Party Con-
gress in which the new economic policy of "doi moi," or renova-
tion, was introduced. Doi moi began with the implementa-
tion of an open-door economic policy to encourage foreign in-
vestment.'28 The goal of doi moi was the attainment of eco-
nomic support and investment from other countries to regener-
ate Vietnam's failing economic system, promote economic
expansion and, ultimately, to establish a private sector and a
market economy.'29 Vietnam suffered for several centuries to
attain political and economic sovereignty. As such, allowing di-
versified ownership of its economic assets was a pivotal step in
its transition to a free-market economy.
The FIL was the first notable piece of legislation that was
passed to spearhead economic reform. At the time, as one com-
mentator observed, the FIL was considered to be "one of the
most liberal foreign investment codes of any developing nation
in the world, let alone Southeast Asia."' The purpose of the
124. See Stauch, supra note 90, at 1030.
125. See supra Part 1.C.
126. See supra Part II.B.2.
127. See Connor, supra note 30, at 482; Luke Aloysius McGrath, Vietnam's
Struggle to Balance Sovereignty, Centralization, and Foreign Investment Under Doi
Moi, 18 FORDHAMi INT'L L.J. 2095, 2095-96 (1995); Stauch, supra note 90, at
1010; Walsh, supra note 102, at 128; Ngo Quang Xuan, Vietnam: Potential Market
and New Opportunities, 19 FORDHA INT'L L.J. 32, 32 (1995).
128. See Jonathan L. Golin, Tiger by the Tail, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1995, at 62, 62.
129. See id.
130. Stauch, supra note 90, at 1011; see also Wuuker, supra note 88, at 365;
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FIL was "to expand economic co-operation with foreign coun-
tries, develop the national economy and increase exports on
the basis of the efficient exploitation of natural resources,
labour, and all other potential of the country."'31
The goals of the FIL were economic growth and industrial
development through increased hard-currency foreign invest-
ment, open competition and private sector development. It was
a major step toward decreasing the VCP's control over the
economy. The law, as one commentator points out, "requires no
minimum levels of Vietnamese participation or equity in Viet-
namese projects and-100 per cent foreign investments are
permitted," though "there is a minimum level of foreign partici-
pation or equity, set at 30 per cent."3 ' Under.Article 3, for-
eign organizations and private entities are authorized to invest
in any sector of Vietnam's economy."' Consequently, the
FIL has opened Vietnam to substantial foreign investment
since its passage.'34
John Dick & Paul A. Delemarre, Vietnam, INTL FIN. L. REV. Spec. Supp., July
1991, at 62, 62; Peter Ruderman, Joint Ventures, INT'L FIN. L. REV. Spec. Supp.,
Feb. 1995, at 17, 17.
131. Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 9, preamble. The FIL was issued
by the Eighth Legislature of the National Assembly of the SRV on December 29,
1987 and was twice amended on June 30, 1990 and again on December 23, 1992.
Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam (amended, supplemented) (visited Nov. 19,
1998) <http://home.vnd.nettenglish/legal-docs/doc00241.html>; see Wunker, supra
note 88, at 364-65; Stephen Hayward & Jennifer Lay, A Brief Overview of Viet-
nam's Foreign Investment Regulations, INTL FIN. L. REV., Spec. Supp. Feb. 1995,
at 9, 9. On February 6, 1991, the Council of Ministers issued its Decree Providing
Regulations on Foreign Investment in Vietnam. Decree Providing Regulations on
Foreign Investment in Vietnam, No. 28-HDBT (1991); see Wunker, supra note 88,
at 365; Dick & Delemarre, supra note 130, at 62. The decree laid out the proce-
dures for implementing the Law on Foreign Investment. The most recent Imple-
menting Regulations were enacted under Decree 18-CP on April 16, 1993. See
Regulations in Detail for the Implementation of the Foreign Investment Law, De-
cree No. 18-CP (1993); see Wunker, supra note 88, at 365.
132. See Dick & Delemarre, supra note 130, at 62.
133. See Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 9, art. 3(1). To further encour-
age investment where it is needed, Article 33 provides for the granting of exemp-
tions from or reductions of taxes by the State body in charge of foreign invest-
ment. See id. art. 33. In addition, Article 35 allows the State body to grant ex-
emptions from or reductions of export and import duties. See id. art. 35.
134. As of June 27, 1995, the State Committee for Cooperation and Investment
(SCCI) approved 1,402 foreign investment projects by foreign partners valued at
16,085,241,667 United States Dollars (USD). See Ngo Duc Manh, Investment Vehi-
cles Under the Law on Foreign Investment in Vietnam, 1 VIENAM L. & LEGAL F.,
July 1995, at 3, 4. The number of projects in operation totaled 1,182 valued at
14,818,096,199 USD. The ten largest investor countries accounted for 76.5 percent
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The FIL offers three ways for investors to do business in
Vietnam: the business cooperation contract, the joint venture
enterprise and the wholly-owned foreign enterprise."5 The
business cooperation contract is a partnership between a for-
eign investor and a Vietnamese partner.' 6 The joint venture
enterprise is "an enterprise set up in Vietnam either by the
two sides pursuant to a joint venture contract, each side com-
prising one or more parties, or pursuant to an agreement be-
tween the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam
and a foreign government ... .'7 There is no ceiling on the
maximum contribution that the foreign partner can make. 8'
As such, the foreign partner can contribute all of the capital in
the joint venture and receive all of the profits from its opera-
tion. The wholly-owned foreign enterprise is "an enterprise the
capital of which is one hundred (100) per cent owned by for-
eign organizations or individuals and which is authorized by
the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to be
established in Vietnam." 39
of the projects in operation and 79.9 percent of the total capital invested. The
countries, listed in descending order of dollars invested, are Taiwan, Hong Kong,
Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, the United States,
France and Switzerland. See id.
135. See Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 9, art. 4.
136. See id. art. 5 (also providing that the rights, obligations and responsibili-
ties of the partners are to be apportioned by mutual agreement within the busi-
ness contract). The business cooperation contract is considered the simplest form of
business investment and no legal entity is'created in this connection. As a result,
the business cooperation contract does not offer the limited liability or tax benefits
that the joint venture and wholly-owned foreign enterprise offer. Id.
137. Id. art. 2(11). Article 27 affords the joint venture limited liability and tax
breaks, making it the most common method of investment for foreign companies.
Id. art. 27. Article 27 states:
[A] joint venture enterprise may be exempted by the State body in
charge of foreign investment from payment of profits tax for a maximum
period of two years commencing from the first profit making year and it
may be allowed a fifty (50) per cent reduction of profits tax for a maxi-
mum period of the two successive years.
Operating losses incurred by a joint venture enterprise in any year
may be carried forward to the following year and set off against the
profits of that year. Any losses remaining after such set off may be car.-
ried forward on the same basis for up to five successive years.
Id. As of 1994, joint ventures accounted for 80 percent of the foreign operations in
Vietnam. See Stauch, supra note 90, at 1015.
138. See Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 9, art. 8.
139. Id. art. 2(12). Article 14 provides that in the case of the wholly-owned
foreign enterprise, the owners "shall assume full responsibility for management of
the enterprise, be subject to the control of the State body in charge of foreign
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The FIL contributes to Vietnam's transition to a market
economy in several ways. First, by opening its economy to
foreign investment, Vietnam has much to gain in production,
technology and management expertise. 4 ' Second, the wholly-
owned foreign enterprise and some forms of joint ventures
authorize complete foreign ownership.' Further, the FIL
gives investors almost complete control over management of
the enterprise.' With respect to joint venture enterprises,
management is vested in a board whose members are chosen
by the joint venture partners.' Finally, the FIL guarantees
protection for foreign investors. Under Article 21, "[tlhe capital
and assets invested in Vietnam by foreign organizations or
individuals shall not be requisitioned or expropriated through
administrative measures. An enterprise with foreign owned
capital shall not be nationalized."' This provision ensures
that the 'government will not appropriate the property or the
assets of foreign investors. As such, it alleviates a prime con-
cern of investors interested in economies that are ruled by a
Communist Party, or that are affected by a changing political
system.'45
The government's hesitation to give up too much control
over the economy is revealed by the detailed provisions requir-
ing all foreign investment projects to gain approval and licens-
ing by the State Committee for Cooperation and Investment
and the local People's Committee of the province in which the
enterprises seek to be established. "' An application laying
out the details of the enterp inse must be submitted to these
committees: a process investors find time consuming and frus-
investment, and be entitled to enjoy the rights and be liable to carry out all obli-
gations stated in the investment license." Id. art. 14. The wholly-owned foreign
enterprise, like the joint venture, enjoys limited liability.
140. See Stauch, supra note 90, at 1016.
141. See Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 9, arts. 2(12), 8.
142. See Dick & Delemarre, supra note 130, at 64 (noting that "[wlith respect
to business cooperation contracts and 100 per cent foreign investment enterprises,
the parties are free to determine their own management arrangements.").
143. See id.
144. Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 9, art. 21.
145. See Stauch, supra note 90, at 1018.
146. See Law on Foreign Investment, supra note 9, art. 37 (requiring "applica-
tion for approval of a business co-operation contract or a joint venture contract,
the establishment of an enterprise with one hundred (100) per cent foreign owned
capital or for investment incentives shall be submitted to the State body in charge
of foreign investment.").
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trating.47 Also, as a rule, joint ventures between foreign and
Vietnamese partners are preferred.'48 This reveals the con-
servative VCP influence over the liberal statutory provisions of
the FIL.
3. Results of the FIL
Despite a few ideological inconsistencies, Vietnam has
attracted a surge of foreign investment since the FIL was in-
troduced. The FIL has even been a catalyst for the reconcilia-
tion of Vietnam with the United States. On December 28,
1993, the United States amended its Foreign Assets Control
Regulations to allow U.S. citizens to participate in develop-
ment projects in Vietnam sponsored by certain international
institutions.'49 Then, on February 3., 1994, President Clinton
147. The application must "be accompanied by the business co-operation or joint
ventures contract, the charter of the joint venture enterprise or enterprise with
one hundred (100) per cent foreign owned capital, a study of the economic and
technical feasibility of the project and such other documents as may be required
by the State body in charge of foreign investment." Id. The feasibility study itself
needs to set out the scope of the venture, the investment to be made by both
parties, the benefits it will bring to the region, the estimated profitability of the
business and the environmental impact. As one author writes:
At the moment, there are far too many government agencies involved in
the foreign investment process, and there are far too many approvals
required at the national, provincial and local levels for foreign investment
to go forward expeditiously for the good of the country or for the good of
foreign investors, and there are far too few people who understand what
the expectations of foreign investors are if they are going to invest sub-
stantial funds.
Irwin Jay Robinson, Current Problems and Opportunities in Vietnam and American
Shortsightedness: a Commentary, BUS. VIETNAM, July 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Busvie File.
148. See Manh, supra note 134, at 6.
149. See Participation in International Institutions' Development Projects in
Vietnam, 58 Fed. Reg. 68,529 (1993) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 500.576). The Presi-
dent signed this amendment in partial recognition of steps taken by the Vietnam-
ese government to account for U.S. prisoners of war and missing in action from
the Vietnam war. See id. at 68,53Q. The amendment authorizes U.S. citizens to
participate in projects in Vietnam formally proposed or approved by international
institutions such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development,
the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations Development Program and the
World Health Organization. See id. U.S. citizens may provide goods and services
for eligible projects as contractors, subcontractors and suppliers. See id. The autho-
rization also permits equity participation in qualified projects such as joint venture
corporations formed to participate in the project. See id. The FACR was also
amended authorizing U.S. banking institutions to process transactions of qualified
international institutions with respect to Vietnam. See id. (codified at 31 C.F.R.
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lifted the United States' trade embargo that had been in effect
against North Vietnam since 1964 and against South Vietnam
since it fell to the North in 1975.50 Finally, on January 28,
1995, the United States and Vietnam entered into the Agree-
ment Concerning the Settlement of Certain Property Claims,
"with a firm desire to reach an early settlement of property
claims in order to develop bilateral economic and trade rela-
tions .... ""' Vietnam now receives considerable foreign in-
vestment from the United States. As of 1995, the United
States was Vietnam's eighth largest investor nation."2
In addition to the United States, Asian and European
nations have invested considerably in Vietnam since the enact-
ment of the FIL."5' The FIL created a regulatory framework
and vehicles for foreign investment. As companion legislation,
Vietnam also issued decrees covering matters such as taxation,
banking, accounting and bankruptcy which provide stability
and certainty in business transactions."
Subsequent to the enactment of the FIL, the VCP passed
the 1992 Constitution to promulgate its new approach to eco-
nomic activities. No articles on the economic system contained
in the 1980 Constitution were adopted into the 1992 Constitu-
tion. The 1992 provisions aim to temper the old centralized
state managerial mechanisms and establish market mecha-
nisms within the economy. Chapter 2 of the 1992 Constitution
contains the articles on the economic system. Chapter 2, Arti-
§500.777).
150. See Prospective Lifting of Vietnam Embargo, 59 Fed. Reg. 5696 (1994) (to
be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 500.578). The President felt that lifting the trade em-
bargo against Vietnam offered the best way to resolve the fate of American prison-
ers of war and missing in action. See id. This regulation authorizes by general
license new transactions involving property in which Vietnamese or its nationals
have an interest. See id. The authorized transactions include imports from and
exports to Vietnam, new investment, travel-related transactions and brokering
transactions. See id.
151. Agreement Concerning the Settlement of Certain Property Claims, Jan. 28,
1995, U.S.-Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 34 I.L.M. 685, 686.
152. See Manh, supra note 134, at 4.
153. See id.
154. See generally Ordinance on the State Bank of Vietnam, May 23, 1990,
translated in 1 SCCI & Fox, supra note 9, at VI-1; Law on Business Bankruptcy,
Dec. 6-30, 1993, translated in 3 SCCI & Fox, supra note 9, at XIV-47; Decision on
Establishment of Business Corporations, Mar. 7, 1994, translated in 3 SCCI &
FOX, supra note 9, at XIV-70-7; Decision on Re-structuring of State Owned Enter-




The state develops the multisectoral commodity economy in
accordance with the market mechanism based on state man-
agement and socialist orientations. The multisectoral eco-
nomic structure with its various diverse forms of production
organization depends on the system of ownership of the en-
tire people, of collectives, and of private parties with the sys-
tem of ownership of the entire people and collectives being at
the core.'55
The VCP also passed several laws to institute the
multisectoral economy it promulgated in the 1992 constitution.
These laws serve as starting points for privatization in Viet-
nam by diversifying ownership rights and providing for a pri-
vate sector in Vietnam's economy.
IV. PRIVATIZATION IN VIETNAM
In December 1990, with significant increases in foreign
investment and its economy expanding, the VCP passed two
laws which began the process of market reform and privatiza-
tion. First, the LC permits the establishment of private limited
liability and share-holding companies. 5 ' Companies initiate
all business operations 57 and own all production materials,
capital and assets.'58 Second, the LPE permits individuals to
establish private enterprises separate from the state.'59 As
with the LC, owners can freely conduct their businesses and
make independent business decisions. 6 ' The owners also own
the means of production, capital and assets. 6'
Several years later, in September 1994, the VCP issued
the TRIBSSOE which allowed the diversification of state
owned firms through the issuance of bonds and the sale of
shares to private entities.'62 State firms approved for these
issuances were authorized to accept investments from private
155. VIETNAhl CONST. art. 15, reprinted in CONSTITIMONS, supra note 97, at 6
(emphasis added).
156. See Law on Companies, supra note 11, art. 1.
157. See id. art. 4.
158. See id. art. 5.
159. See Law on Private Enterprises, supra note 12, preamble.
160. See id. art. 3.
161. See id. art. 4.
162. See TRIBSSOE, supra note 13, art. 1.
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parties. It should be noted that the purpose of TRIBSSOE was
not to completely transfer ownership and management of state
firms into private hands. The purpose was to mobilize capital
for investment within state owned enterprises.163 Therefore,
private owners were more like investors than true owners of
the state-run firms. Also, the decree was issued for one year as
an attempt, on a trial basis, to incorporate free market mecha-
nisms into Vietnam's state sector.
A. Legislative Measures
Vietnam's market reform legislation demonstrates the
VCP's interest in developing a multi-sector economy and in
protecting investors. The legislation reveals the VCP's concomi-
tant desire for investment in both the private and state sec-
tors, as well as the VCP's willingness to decrease its control
over the economy. At the same time, Vietnam's market reform
legislation also reveals a degree of hesitancy to give up too
much control."6
1. The Law on Companies
The LC permits Vietnamese individuals to establish limit-
ed liability and shareholding companies. 6 ' Individuals are
the sole owners. They invest "capital, share the profits, and
bear the losses."'66 Further, a company is "free to carry out
business and make independent decisions in relation to busi-
ness activities."'67 The government does not make business
decisions or assist ailing firms. Thus, company owners are en-
couraged to pursue the efficient and productive use of company
assets. Companies that are not productive do not and should
not survive. In fact, the LC contains provisions for the dissolu-
tion of companies through the Law on Business Bankrupt-
cy.! By allowing companies to operate, free from govern-
163. See id. arts. 1, 2.
164. See Law on Companies, supra note 11, preamble; Law on Private Enter-
prises, supra note 12, preamble.
165. See Law on Companies, supra note 11, art. 1.
166. Id. art. 2.
167. Id. art. 4.
168. See id. art. 23; Law on Business Bankruptcy, supra note 154. The Law on
Business Bankruptcy is an example of Vietnam's commitment to creating the
necessary legal framework for a workable market economy.
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ment interference, the LC induces competition and free market
behavior, providing a foundation for a free market in Vietnam.
The economic liberalization offered by the LC is not abso-
lute. Like investors under the FIL, the founding members of a
company must submit an application to the People's Commit-
tee of the province or city where its head office will be
based.6 9 This permits the government to maintain control
and to carefully consider applications, rejecting any which
would, in its expectation, fail to improve the economy.'70
Article 11 requires approval from the Prime Minister for
the establishment of companies proposing to conduct business
in certain economic sectors.'7' This allows the government to
maintain a significant degree of control over certain areas of
the economy. Article 13 further infringes on company autono-
my by requiring the company to give priority to the use of
domestic labor.72 This can hurt businesses that would bene-
fit by using the specialized skills of foreign individuals.
Further government control occurs if a company wants to
establish a branch office outside of the province where its head
office is located. Article 20 requires another application to be
submitted to the People's Committee.73 Similarly, when a
169. See Law on Companies, supra note 11, art. 14.
170. See Stauch, supra note 90, at 1032.
171. See Law on Companies, supra note 11, art. 11. Specifically, Article 11
requires approval of the Prime Minister for
companies which propose to conduct business in the following areas and
occupations:
1. Manufacture and distribution of explosives, poisons and toxic chemi-
cals.
2. Mining of certain precious minerals.
3. Production and supply of electricity and water on a large scale.
4. Manufacture of information transmitting facilities, postal and telecom-
munication services, broadcasting, television and publication.
5. Ocean shipping and air transportation.
6. Specialist export and import business.
7. International tourism.
Id.
172. See id. art. 13(2).
173. See id. art. 20(1).
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company wants to change its objectives, area of business, char-
ter capital, or any other items on its business registration file,
Article 21 provides that it must notify the planning committee
which issued its certificate of business. 74 Finally, Articles 22
and 23 control a company in the case of dissolution. Article 22
sets forth the circumstances-such as achievement of objec-
tives, loss of "three fourths of its charter capital," or "insur-
mountable difficulties"-under which a dissolution would be
permitted.7 5 An- application must be submitted to the Peo-
ple's Committee clearly stating the procedures for liquidation
of assets, the time for payment of debts and the settlement of
all contracts. A company's dissolution may only occur upon a
grant of approval of the application. 6
2. The Law on Private Enterprises
The LPE allows Vietnamese individuals to establish pri-
vate enterprises. The private enterprise is defined as "a busi-
ness unit which has a level of capital no less than that of its
legal capital, which is owned by an individual who shall.., be
responsible for its business activities."'77 The business is per-
mitted to generate profits from its operations, the sale of its
products, or the provisions of its services."7 ' The private own-
er is free to operate the business and make independent deci-
sions in relation to its activities.79 The state no longer de-
cides what, when, how and how much to produce. Accordingly,
private enterprises are given a significant degree of autonomy.
As with the LC, this allows private enterprises to pursue
methods that are efficient, productive and highly competitive,
thereby minimizing their risk of failure.
As with the LC, the "economic freedom provided by the
LPE is limited. The government requires individuals to submit
174. See id. art. 21.
175. Id. art. 22.
176. See id. art. 23.
177. Law on Private Enterprises, supra note 12, art. 2.
178. See id.
179. See id. art. 4. Article 22 of the LPE grants the owners of private enter-
prises important rights that include the right to choose the area of activities and
scale of businesses, select methods of raising revenue, select customers, enter into
direct transactions and sign contracts with customers, hire required labor, use
earned foreign currencies, make decisions regarding how to use remaining revenue
and take initiatives in all registered business activities. See id. art. 22.
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applications to the People's Committee, which is authorized
by the Government to grant licenses.18° Article 9 of the LPE
states several requirements that must be met before a license
will be granted. First, the enterprise's specific business plan
must be provided to the People's Committee defining in detail
the enterprise's "[olbjectives, branches, and areas of busi-
ness." 8' Second, the initial capital in the enterprise must be
no less than the amount mandated by the Government for that
type of business.'82 Finally, the owner or manager employed
by the owner must have the qualifications required by law for
that area of business. 83
The LPE's Article 9 requirements restrict private owners
from making several important decisions. When an individual
attempts to establish a business in a certain area, the govern-
ment may impose restrictions in order to protect itself. Fur-
ther, the initial capital requirement prevents owners from
deciding the amount of capital they want to initially invest.
Where the Government's required initial capital is significantly
higher than the capital an individual can muster, a potential
owner may be stymied. Finally, the qualifications for owners
and managers may prevent individuals from establishing busi-
nesses in areas in which their technical knowledge is found to
fall short of the level required by the government. Some re-
quirements, such as those for doctors, pharmacists and engi-
neers are reasonable. However, if a business is not particularly
technical, such restrictions may be unnecessarily burdensome.
Similar to the LC, the LPE requires approval when a pri-
vate enterprise wants to establish a branch or representative
office outside the province of its head office." It also requires
the same notification when a business wants to change its
objectives, area of specialization, initial invested capital, or
other items contained in its business registration file.'
Bankruptcy procedures also work the same as in the LPE.86
Article 24 of the LPE addresses enterprise sales and merg-
180. See id., art. 10.
181. Id. art. 9(1).
182. See id. art. 9(2).
183. See id. art. 9(3).
184. See id. art. 14.
185. See id. art. 15.
186. See id. art. 16.
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ers, an area not mentioned in the LC. While enterprise sales
and mergers are authorized under the LPE, the owner must
again submit an application to the People's Committee and
the sale or merger may only take effect after the application is
approved.'87 Finally, Article 25, like Article 13 of the CL, fur-
ther intrudes on enterprise autonomy by requiring owners to
give priority to the use of local labor.'88 This restricts busi-
nesses that may benefit from the use of foreign workers.
3. The Temporary Regulation on the Issuance of
Bonds and Stocks of State Owned Enterprises
The TRIBSSOE was Vietnam's first step toward privatiz-
ing state owned firms. The Government Decree containing
TRIBSSOE authorized the issuance of bonds and stocks of
state owned enterprises.'89 Although the objective was to mo-
bilize capital for operating state owned enterprises,1 90 pur-
chasers received some interests and decision making con-
trol.'9' The rights and duties of stock-owners included: partic-
ipating in stock holder meetings to vote for the board of man-
agers and on amendments to by-laws, business plan and profit
sharing arrangements; receiving share interests in production
output; enjoying tax preferences on the revenues from share
interests; and liability for disbanded or bankrupt enterprises in
accordance with enterprise by-laws and bankruptcy law.192
Although bond holders did not receive the same rights, the
mere fact the bonds must be attractive to investors gave poten-
187. See id. art. 24.
188. See id. art. 25(3).
189. See TRIBSSOE Decree, supra note 13, art. 1.
190. See TRIBSSOE, supra note 13, arts. 1, 2.
191. See id. art. 23 (listing stock owner's interests, and responsibilities). The
TRIBSSOE provides that the following persons are eligible to buy the stocks and
bonds of state-owned enterprises:
a. Vietnamese nationals residing both in and out of the country [and]
foreigners living and working in Vietnam.
b. Vietnamese enterprises of all economic fields and sectors....
c. Mass associations and organizations.
d. Enterprises with foreign invested capital operating in accordance with
the law on foreign investment in Vietnam.
Id. art. 5. "[Sltate offices, the armed forces, and [state] social associations are pro-
hibited from using capital provided by the State budget to buy bonds and stocks
of state-owned enterprises." Id.
192. See id. art. 23.
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tial bond purchasers some degree of indirect control. To the
extent that bonds issued by state firms had to be attractive to
investors, some degree of free market behavior was introduced
into this area.
Not surprisingly, as in the LC, the LPE and the FIL, in
order to issue bonds and stocks state firms had to meet specific
requirements. In order to issue bonds, state owned enterprises
had to be profit-yielding during the three years immediately
preceding the issue, must have been financially healthy and
must have had prospects for development.'93 In addition, the
enterprises had to be guaranteed by the Ministry of Finance or
a "prestigious intermediate financial organization."'94 State
enterprises wishing to issue stocks were required to obtain
business licenses and permission to privatize.9  Newly
formed enterprises had to be authorized prior to their estab-
lishment and had to assure that the "total value of state
stocks" would "not be less than 30 per cent of the total capital
of the enterprise 0."'96 In addition, they had to submit appli-
cations for issuing stocks, enterprise by-laws, business plans,
plans for the stock issue and the draft announcement of the
issue. "'97
B. Evaluation of Vietnam's Privatization Laws
Prior to economic reform, individuals could only concede to
the economic activities of the VCP. Since the goal of socialism
was to manage the economy for the good of all Vietnamese
citizens, this was considered sufficient to guarantee economic
well-being. "For the good of all" is an illusive objective, howev-
er, defined by whoever is in power at the time. Thus, what is
considered good for Vietnamese citizens by the ruling govern-
ment may not be satisfactory to the individual citizens them-
selves. With the LC, LPE and the TRIBSSOE, the VCP grant-
ed specific rights to individuals and economic organizations to
participate in economic activities with less government inter-
ference.
193. See id. art. 18(3).
194. See id. art. 18(5).
195. See id. art. 25(1).
196. Id. art. 25(2).
197. See id. art. 26.
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Vietnam is now in a position to develop thoughtful policies
and laws for privatization. Politically, there has not been an
explosive rebellion or abrupt ousting of the government as
there was in Eastern Europe. 9 ' The changes in the Vietnam-
ese government occurred through the electoral process with
many VCP leaders being defeated by new, more liberal politi-
cians.'99 These new party members have spurred some of the
first changes in the balance of economic power between the
state and private entities within the confines of the VCP. Al-
though political tensions persist between conservative VCP
members and the new liberal forces, they have yet to reach the
point of paralyzing reform.
The VCP's attempt to establish a market economy has
been successful in several ways. The legislation passed in the
last few years promulgates initial steps toward creating a
private sector in Vietnam's economy. The LC and the LPE
provide a foundation for a market economy by allowing individ-
uals to establish companies and private enterprises in which
they can generate profits and incur losses. These laws induce
investment into a private sector and encourage competition
and market-oriented behavior among businesses.
The LC and the LPE also establish obligations for business
owners that greatly encourage the development of a strong
economy in Vietnam. They include: guarantees for the quality
of goods, observation of regulations protecting the environ-
ment, protection of social security, keeping books of accounts
required by the Ordinance on Accounting and Statistics and
paying taxes. These requirements, along with provisions con-
cerning bankruptcy, corruption and procedures for breaches,
provide an economic and legal infrastructure in Vietnam.
The VCP's openness toward domestic and foreign invest-
ment and establishing a private sector in its economy is limit-
ed in several ways. These limits hamper the country's imple-
mentation of a market economy. To some investors, the LC and
the LPE provisions that require approval of a detailed business
plan in order to obtain a development license, the use of do-
mestic labor wherever possible, approval when changing objec-
tives, area of business or capital contributions and approval
198. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
199. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
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when declaring bankruptcy, create frustrating delays and gen-
erate excess bureaucracy. In effect, these provisions allow the
VCP to safeguard its power. Investors are likely to view these
approval provisions as opportunities for government corruption
and favoritism which previously inhibited them from investing
in Vietnam. Consequently, the VCP's attempt to protect its
own power could create investor reluctance which would un-
dermine economic reform and stall the country's transition to a
market economy.
. The approval processes, however, are not completely prob-
lematic. It is not unusual for businesses to be required to reg-
ister with the appropriate economic authority within a city or
state. In fact, filing is fundamental for effective economic
transactions such as financing and property transfers. Further-
more, several approval requirements are reasonable consider-
ing the sectors of the economy they address. Both the LC and
the LPE require approval by the Prime Minister when propos-
ing to conduct business in areas usually preserved for the
state. These areas include, for example, supply of electricity
and water, postal and telecommunication services, broadcast-
ing, television and publication and manufacture and distribu-
tion of explosives. Due to the degree of public service these
areas entail, many nations regulate them heavily."'
The VCP's attempt to privatize its state sector with the
TRIBSSOE reveals several things. First, the VCP is proceeding
cautiously. Companies were required to have 3 years of profit
and prospects for growth in order to sell bonds or shares of
stock. This highlights the government's desire to prevent eco-
nomic hardship, while it attempts to improve or privatize state
firms. Second, the fact that decisions allowing state firms to
issue bonds or stock were made by the Ministry of Finance and
other government bodies indicates that the VCP still wants to
control how much privatization of the state sector occurs. The
decision to relinquish control over particular firms remains,
ultimately, with the VCP.
Furthermore, it is important to realize that the decree to
sell bonds and stocks in state enterprises was temporary. That
is, it was issued with the stipulation that after a trial year, "the
Minister of Finance and the Governor of the State Bank of
200. See Baev, supra note 2, at 12.
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Vietnam would draw conclusions and experiences for adding to
and completing the document. Then, the Government would
review these conclusions and consider officially using the docu-
ment to further implement a market economy.
20
'
Considering the tensions within the VCP between conser-
vatives and reformers in the last several Party Congresses, it
is uncertain whether this temporary regulation will attain a
degree of permanence any time soon. Although the decree was
a bold effort to implement privatization in the state sector, the
effect has been less robust than might have been anticipated.
Few state firms have been completely privatized. Among 6,000
state firms in 1995, only 8 had been privatized by April
1996.202
Vietnam's legislative measures reveal that the VCP is
implementing a market economy cautiously. In contrast to
Eastern Europe, the VCP is not completely eliminating .the
state sector. The VCP is maintaining and restructuring state
firms while encouraging the establishment of private enterpris-
es, stock and limited liability companies and foreign invest-
ment projects. Similar to the PRC, Vietnam seems to be estab-
lishing the foundations of a market economy and inducing
market-oriented behavior in a separate private sector while
introducing limited privatization in the state sector."3
V. CONCLUSION
A. Vietnam's Economy at the End of the 20th Century
Currently, Vietnam is at a significant point in its economic
transition. It is imperative that the VCP continue to focus on
establishing a private economic sector and furthering its pro-
cess of privatization in order to fully realize its transition to a
market economy.2° For the first time in many years, Viet-
nam is freed from isolation and embargo and it is becoming
201. See TRIBSSOE Decree, supra note 13, art. 2.
202. See Vietnam Moves to Clarify Privatisation Process, REUTER EUR. BUS.
REP., Apr. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS News Library, Curnws File.
203. See Cao, supra note 7, at 107.
204. See John Chalmers, Hanoi Wins World Bank Loan Pledges and Praise,
REUTER ASIA-PACIFIC Bus. REP., May 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File. World Bank President James Wolfensohn told a news conference
after meeting Vietnam's leadership that "to keep economic growth on track Hanoi
needed to promote the private sector." Id.
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integrated into the world economy." 5 Several factors exist
which can be expected to add pressure for continued, or even
accelerated, movement to a privatized economy. International
organizations such as the World Bank, OECD and the Asian
Development Bank are providing loans and economic aid to
Vietnam."6 These organizations generally favor the swift
development of market mechanisms.0 7 They offer Vietnam
important resources and thus have the power to exert pressure
on Vietnam by withholding support if Vietnam does not further
implement a market economy. Vietnam has also become an
official member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN)."8 Its membership status could be affected if state
firms prevent tariff reductions in the ASEAN Free Trade Ar-
ea.2"9 In addition, Vietnam's attempt to become a member of
the World Trade Organization could be considerably inhibited
if it fails to pursue market reform.210 Finally, foreign inves-
tors from market economy nations could become reluctant to
invest in Vietnam. if reform does not proceed quickly. Conse-
quently, in order for Vietnam to further its economic transi-
tion, it should maintain a steady course as it pursues privatization "
205. See Premier Presents Government Work Report, supra note 111.
206. In the middle of 1996, the World Bank offered $1.5 billion in development
loans to Vietnam over the next three years. See id. In addition, the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) invited Vietnamese officials to
participate in workshops and seminars for reforming former Soviet-type economies.
See Private Sector Role Defined, supra note 37. Further, the Asian Development
Bank plans to lend Vietnam $1.5 billion for 1997-2000. See Vietnam: Review 1997,
supra note 77.
207. See supra note 193 and accompanying quote referring to the World Bank;
see also Private Sector Role Defined, supra note 72 (referring to OECD). OECD
officials visiting Hanoi in July 1996 said that private enterprises and an equal
playing field for all in Vietnam's economy, including foreign firms, were both es-
sential. See id.
208. See id.
209. See Vietnam, supra note 78. In December 1996, Foreign Minister Nguyen
Manh Cam affirmed Vietnam's commitment to meet Association of Southeast Asian
Nations Free Trade Area tariff reduction targets in 2006. See id. Some economists
believe that vested interests in the state sector will be a counterweight against
such reductions. See id.
210. See generally Vietnam, supra note 78 (discussing the government level
mission that Vietnam set up in early May 1997 to negotiate for the country's
admission to the WTO); Premier Presents Government Work Report, supra note 111
(explaining Vietnam's efforts to join the WTO by establishing diplomatic ties with
more than 150 nations).
211. As of August 1996, Vietnam has attracted $20 billion in foreign invest-
ment. See Economic Reforms Threatened, supra note 10. However, of the more
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An additional issue concerning Vietnam's economic transi-
tion is the political dichotomy within the VCP. Reform-minded
VCP members want to keep economic reform at its current
pace. Old-time conservatives want to slow down and proceed
gradually.212 These conflicts further threaten Vietnam's eco-
nomic progress.1 ' During its June 1996 Party Congress, the
VCP reaffirmed the key role of the state in development and
made it clear that it wanted to see the state's role in the econ-
omy increased and its own influence enhanced. 14 The coun-
try's economic legislation and reform measures reveal that the
VCP is promoting change while maintaining a large degree of
control.215 The government allows some economic freedom
without giving up its control.216
While the number of state owned enterprises has shrunk,
through mergers and closures, by approximately 50% since
1991, of those remaining, the majority are making a small
profit or breaking even.1 7 The overall return on capital in-
vested in the state sector is still low, making a small contribu-
than 6,000 state firms, few have been equitized. See Vietnam Moves to Clarify
Privatisation Process, supra note 202. "Equitisation" is the government's term for
privatization. See id. It refers "to plans for the partial selling off of state enter-
prises under moves aimed at raising capital for reinvestment and increasing effi-
ciency." Id. Furthermore, the stock market, originally planned for 1996, is unlikely
to open until 1999. See Vietnam Says Stock Market Will Take Three Years,
REUTERS FIN. SERVICE, March 9, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File. With so much investor interest in Vietnam, the government is losing the
opportunity to utilize foreign capital by failing to further economic change. Japa-
nese firms are reluctant to invest billions of yen in Vietnam until the reform
process both quickens and strengthens. See Balance Sheet Blues Delay Privatiza-
tion, BUS. VIETNAM, May 1995, available in LEXIS News Library, Busvie File.
Although Japan is Vietnam's biggest trading partner and aid donor, in May
1995, Japanese firms had only pledged investment of $950 million since 1988,
behind top investor Taiwan with $2.5 billion. See id.
212. See Economic Reforms Threatened, supra note 10.
213. See generally id. (reporting about a political report issued in April 1996
reaffirming the primacy of state management and socialism). As of the middle of
1996, conservative VCP members were succeeding in stunting Vietnam's
privatisation program advocated by the World Bank. See id.
214. See id; John Chalmers, Vietnam's Party Clinches Stability, Continuity,
REUTERS WORLD SERVICE, July 1, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File.
215. See Stauch, supra note 90, at 1013 (defining this as market socialism); cf
Cao, supra note 7, at 100 (pertaining to China).
216. See Stauch, supra note 90, at 1031-32.
217. See Vietnam: Review 1997, supra note 77.
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tion to state revenues.218 It is arguably more beneficial to fo-
cus new laws and reform measures on developing a new pri-
vate sector than to attempt to re-regulate, re-legislate and re-
structure state owned enterprises, which have long been ineffi-
cient and costly. The VCP has yet to concede to this argument.
Privatization of state owned enterprises has occurred slowly
and reluctantly.
Vietnam is adopting a gradual privatization model similar
to the PRC. Due to its political context, this is appropriate.
Vietnam faces political divisions similar to the PRC between
economic reformers and conservatives. As such, gradual privat-
ization will prevent the political upheaval that can occur if
reform proceeds too quickly. Vietnam's economic circumstances
differ from the PRC. The PRC instituted privatization as a
means of divesting citizens of the enormous savings they had
accumulated. Conversely, most Vietnamese do not have a large
build-up of savings. The country needs considerable economic
support from international institutions and other nations in
order to sustain economic growth. Vietnam needs to consider
the preferences of these institutions and nations in order to
ensure their continued support. Many of the institutions and
nations from which Vietnam needs such support are propo-
nents of "big bang" privatization. Therefore, Vietnam needs to
keep progressing with its transition to a market economy in
order to continue to attract investment and capital. Vietnam
does not need to transform as urgently as the Soviet-bloc coun-
tries in Eastern Europe. However, reform needs to proceed
steadily in order to maintain Vietnam's new economic growth,
new relationships and new ties with the world economy.
B. Proposals for Vietnam into the 21st Century
During the early 1990s much was achieved by Vietnam in
a short period of time. The country actively encouraged foreign
investment and prepared for privatization by establishing the
foundations for a private sector. The country is currently pro-
ceeding at a slower pace than during the early years of reform.
In order to further its transition from a NME to a market
economy nation, this Note proposes several steps for Vietnam.
In order to strengthen the effect of the LC and the LPE,
218. See id.
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the government should draft implementing regulations. Such
regulations would provide clarity and predictability in the
procedures for setting up enterprises, filing the proper forms
and redressing grievances. The implementing regulations
should include specific guidelines directed to ministries when
they determine whether to grant a license to a particular en-
terprise. This would help to prevent the corruption and favorit-
ism that infiltrate laws that allow such extensive government
regulation.
Vietnam also needs to develop a more consistent national
policy for economic reform. This is especially important be-
cause of the country's need for financial assistance. The politi-
cal dichotomy within the VCP has the potential to deter inter-
national organizations from contributing financial support and
foreign investors from investing. The VCP needs to be more
united than it has been in the past few years. It needs to stop
vacillating between reform and no reform policies. Of course, it
is utopian to think that the vestiges of communism and state
control will be whisked away by the new liberal VCP members.
However, it would benefit Vietnam's economic transition con-
siderably if conservatives would acknowledge the progress
Vietnam's economy has experienced as a result of its economic
reform measures and that this progress is at risk if the govern-
ment reverses its course. Gradual privatization of Vietnam's
state owned enterprises has some substantial advantages, such
as controlling unemployment and maintaining levels of pro-
duction. Moreover, by proceeding with the development of a
private sector with market-mechanisms, the sale or dissolution
of inefficient state owned enterprises will not have as devastat-
ing an impact on the economy as would an immediate transfer
from state to private ownership without a private sector in
place.
Finally, the VCP needs to continue to develop a legal
924 [Vol. XXII:3
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framework to support its economic growth. As more individuals
establish companies and invest in business enterprises, it will
be necessary to have courts and laws that address the inevita-
ble breaches, grievances and problems that arise from business
transactions.
With clearer application of its economic legislation, more
privatization of state firms and a legal framework to support
business transactions, Vietnam has the potential to become an
economic center of Asia as it proceeds into the 21st century.
Pamela L. Polevoy

